Negotiable certificates of deposit (negotiable CDs) are the most important source of purchased funds to U. S. banks that are practitioners of liabilities management.
Moreover, they have become one of the major types of liquid assets in the portfolios of many investors.
Recent financial market developments, including increased competition among financial institutions, high and sometimes volatile patterns of interest rates, and regulatory changes have all led to significant changes in the money markets generally, and in the market for negotiable CDs in particular. This article describes the market for negotiable CDs, placing particular emphasis on developments that have occurred over the past decade or so.
Types of Issuers
It is possible to distinguish between four general classes of negotiable CDs based on the type of issuer, because the characteristics of these four types of CDs, including rates paid, risk, and depth of market, can vary considerably.
The most important, and the oldest of the four groups, consists of negotiable CDs, called domestic CDs, issued by U. S. banks domestically.
Dollar denominated negotiable
CDs issued by banks abroad are called Eurodollar
CDs or Euro CDs,1 while negotiable CDs issued by the U. S. branches of foreign banks are known as Yankee CDs.
Finally, some nonbank depository institutions, particularly savings and loan associations, have begun to issue negotiable CDs. These are referred to as thrift CDs.
Domestic
CDs Negotiable CDs issued by U. S. banks domestically are large denomination (greater than $100,000) time deposit liabilities evidenced by a written instrument or certificate. The certificate specifies the amount of the deposit, the maturity date, the rate of interest, and the terms under which interest is calculated. While banks are free to offer market determined interest rates on time deposits in amounts above $100,000, negotiable CDs included, the mini-1 Some dollar denominated CDs are issued in foreign locations other than Europe.
For example, banks in Hong Kong have issued Asian CDs, while the branches of at least two U. S. banks have issued Nassau CDs. Markets for these instruments are just developing, however. mum denomination acceptable for secondary market trading in domestic CDs is $1 million.
The term to maturity on newly issued domestic CDs is the outcome of negotiation between a bank and its customers, the individual instrument usually tailored to fit the liquidity requirements of the purchaser. Regulations limit the minimum maturity on deposits of U. S. banks to 30 days.2
Newly issued domestic CDs typically have maturities that run from 30 days to 12 months.
The average maturity of outstanding negotiable CDs is about three months.
Interest rates on newly issued negotiable CDs, called primary market rates, are determined by market forces and sometimes are directly negotiated between the issuer and the depositor. Domestic CD rates are quoted on an interest-bearing basis; rates on most other money market instruments, such as Treasury bills, bankers acceptances, and commercial paper are calculated on a discount basis. Interest is computed for the actual number of days to maturity on a 360-day year basis and can be either fixed for the term of the instrument or variable. Interest on fixed-rate negotiable CDs with original terms to maturity of up to one year is normally paid at maturity ; on longer-dated instruments, interest is normally paid semiannually.
If variable, the rate usually changes every month or three months and is tied to the secondary market rate on domestic CDs having maturities equal to the variable term of the contract. Domestic CDs may be issued in either registered or bearer form.
The great majority of negotiable CDs, however, are bearer instruments.
In fact, most banks automatically classify bearer CDs as negotiable instruments and classify registered CDs along with large time deposits open account as nonnegotiable instruments.
Domestic CDs are paid for in immediately available funds on the day of purchase.
They are redeemed for immediately available funds on the maturity date. Many investors in domestic CDs prefer to purchase and settle in New York. For this reason, regional banks that are active in the CD market issue and redeem their CDs sold to national customers through a New York correspondent bank acting as a clearing agent.
Early History3
As corporations became more adept at cash management during the 1950's, they were able to economize on their holdings of demand deposits.
Since few banks offered corporations interest-bearing deposits as alternatives to checking balances, businesses turned to other investment sources, particularly commercial paper, Treasury bills, and repurchase agreements with securities dealers.
Consequently, there was a sharp decline in the importance of corporate deposits on the banking system's balance sheet.
Large money center banks especially felt this loss of funds since they relied on corporate demand deposits to a greater extent than other, smaller banks.
This situation prompted First National City Bank of New York to introduce negotiable CDs, which were offered first to the bank's foreign customers in August 1960. Investor response to this move was only modest, however, due in part to the lack of a secondary market for the certificates. In February 1961 First National City Bank began to offer negotiable CDs not only to foreign investors, but to domestic investors as well.
A simultaneous development crucial to the success of the new instrument was the announcement by the Discount Corporation of New York, a large Government securities dealer, that it would make a secondary market for the negotiable CDs of money center banks.
The new negotiable CD was specifically designed to attract corporate deposits, and to serve as a source of funds flexible enough to accommodate changes in short-term loan demand. Other major New York banks quickly followed 'the lead of First National City Bank in offering negotiable CDs, and most of the leading U. S. 
The Importance of Regulation
Unlike most other participants in the domestic money market, commercial banks are heavily regulated. Government regulation has had an important influence on the development of the market for negotiable CDs since its inception.
Two Federal Reserve regulations in particular have had an influence on the negotiable CD market, namely Regulation Q, which governs interest paid on deposits by member banks, and Regulation D; which prescribes reserve requirements that must be held against deposits.
Until May 1973, Regulation Q specified an interest ceiling that could not be exceeded on newly issued negotiable CDs of at least some maturities. At times, these ceilings were binding, i.e., they limited banks to paying rates below open market rates.
In the early period of the development of the market for negotiable CDs, for example, there was a 1 percent ceiling rate on time deposits of less than three months' maturity.
Since market interest rates on competing instruments were greater than 1 percent, this ceiling effectively prohibited banks from issuing short-dated CDs. Then in late 1961, the rate on 3-month Treasury bills edged upward and exceeded the 2½ percent Regulation ceiling rate in effect for 3-to 6-month CDs. Within the first year in which they were offered, therefore, banks were forced into a noncompetitive position vis-à-vis the money market alternatives to negotiable CDs in the maturity range out to six months.
In July 1963 the Regulation Q ceiling for CDs maturing in three months or longer was raised to a competitive 4 percent. The artifically low rate ceiling on CDs of less than three months' maturity was raised in November 1964, so that banks were finally able to compete with other money market instruments.
In subsequent periods, however, Regulation Q ceilings again became binding, with important consequences for the negotiable CD market. These episodes will be examined later when growth in domestic CDs is discussed. the shallower trough for the New York banks suggests that these institutions are more reliant on such deposits as a primary source of funds. Comparing the trends for the two series suggests that large regional banks have been expanding their negotiable CD positions faster than the New York money center institutions, a situation explained by the spread of liabilities management practices outside the money centers and by the generally faster rate of increase in business lending at regional banks during the last decade.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND
The share of total negotiable CDs attributable to the New York banks has trended downward since 1975, falling from nearly 60 percent to less than one-third by late 1979.
Within the first decade of its existence, the market for negotiable CDs suffered two major setbacks from an otherwise rapid growth trend.
These episodes, which occurred in 1966 and 1969-70, both were a result of binding Regulation Q ceilings. The Regulation Q ceiling on negotiable CDs of all maturities was raised to 5½ percent in December 1965, following the pattern set by short-term open market rates. When market rates moved above this level in early 1966, however, the Federal Reserve took no further action to keep banks competitive in the money markets; this was a departure from previous practice and reflected the System's desire to slow growth in bank loans.
Consequently, new issues of domestic CDs declined and outstandings dropped by about $3 billion or 16 percent in the last quarter of 1966. Secondary market activity also slumped during this period.
When short-term rates dropped sharply in early 1967, however, new issue and secondary market activity quickly recovered. This interest rate decline was short-lived, however, and by late 1967 open market rates again began to push up against the Regulation Q ceiling. The ceiling rate on 6-month to l-year CDs was raised by one percentage point to 6% percent in 1968, but by later in the year even longer term negotiable CDs lost competitiveness with other money market instruments.
A wide gap opened between Regulation Q ceiling rates and open market rates in 1969, and this gap was not eliminated when the ceilings were raised on CDs of all maturities in January 1970. Outstanding negotiable CDs declined by over $13 billion, or more than half of the total amount outstanding, between December 1968 and February 1970. The decline would have been even greater had it not been for a special exemption that allowed banks to sell CDs to foreign official institutions (i.e., governments and central banks) without regard to the regulatory ceiling.
During the runoff, banks issued about $2 billion in negotiable CDs to such investors.
The secondary market in negotiable CDs almost completely disappeared during this period as dealers eliminated their positions and trading declined to almost zero. This, of course, greatly reduced the liquidity of the remaining negotiable CDs outstanding.
In June 1970, the collapse of the Penn Central Transportation Company gave rise to fears of a general liquidity crisis, as businesses found themselves unable to issue commercial paper.
One very important action taken in response to this crisis was removal of the Regulation Q ceiling on short-term CDs, i.e., those with maturities from 30 to 89 days. Bank new issue rates on l-to 3-month CDs quickly rose to competitive levels and the volume of outstanding CDs resumed rapid growth.
The ceiling on longer term negotiable CDs was removed three years later in May 1973. Since the early 1970's, therefore, the market for domestic CDs has been conducted in an atmosphere free of constraints on interest rates. Strong demand for bank credit, particularly for business loans, led to a boom in the issuance of do- This decline was prompted by a surge in the growth of small time deposits, spurred by large increases in Money Market Certificates, combined with softening in the demand for total bank credit. Accelerating credit demand by businesses, however, led to renewed growth in domestic CDs after mid-1979.
Money Center versus Regional
About one-third of domestic CDs are issued by a handful of large money center banks in New York City, while the remainder are issued by about two hundred large regional banks located around the U.. S. Although both the money center and regional institutions sell their newly issued instruments primarily to large national and multinational investors, the former group of banks is much more -heavily involved in this market.
Banks issuing negotiable CDs usually post a list of base rates, with spreads expressed in increments of five basis points, for the various maturities they are writing.
These rates are adjusted upward or downward depending on the particular bank's need. for funds and on market conditions. Regional banks located in cities that serve as headquarters for major corporations are often able to book a large portion of their CDs directly through the main office, without having to work through a New York correspondent.
The regional issuers that are most active in the CD market, however, keep a supply of blank but signed certificates in New York so that investors not located in their area and wishing to purchase their CDs can do so conveniently.
Regional banks that issue large amounts of domestic CDs but that depend heavily on purchases by investors located outside their geographic area typically employ a sales force to actively market their certificates.
Although almost all banks on occasion sell their newly issued certificates to securities dealers, most prefer to sell directly to investors. The advantages of selling directly to retail include paying a lower rate on the new issues, since the dealer intermediary is eliminated, and having more information over where certificates are ending up. Banks would prefer that their CDs be held as investments and not sold before maturity, since secondary market sales could compete with attempts to market new offerings in the future. Although dealers sometimes hold CDs for investment purposes, most of their purchases are passed through to retail investors in the secondary or resale market.
Regional banks that are attempting to build a name in the domestic CD market, or that are trying to reestablish a name after a period of inactivity, generally must operate through dealers.
In these cases, the dealers accept marketing responsibility for the newly issued certificates.
When particularly large offerings, come to market most banks, even the money center institutions, rely on dealers to help distribute the issue. A new offering of several hundred million dollars, for example, may be difficult to place directly even for a bank with a large base of regular customers.
Over the years, investors have developed preferences for the CDs of certain issuers, or groups of issuers, that are reflected in the rate structure on CDs. The rate required on the CD of a top name bank may be 5 to 25 basis points lower than that required on the CD of a lesser known institution. Historically, the rate spread on domestic CDs of the top and lesser name issuers has fluctuated with the level of interest rates, the spread widening in high interest rate periods.
Prior to 1974, investors distinguished roughly between two groups of issuing banks in the domestic CD market, prime and nonprime. The prime banks included the large and wellknown major money-center institutions, while the nonprime category included the smaller, lesser known regional banks.
In The incentive to U. S. banks to start issuing CDs abroad was provided by regulations restricting their ability to raise funds in the domestic money market, especially Regulation Q. Since it is free of interest rate regulation, the Eurodollar market provides banks the opportunity to raise funds for domestic lending even when their ability to issue domestic CDs is restricted. The Euro CD market has grown rapidly since 1966. As shown on Chart 2, Euro CD outstandings at London banks totaled over $43 billion at year-end 1979. The foreign branches of U. S. banks dominate the London dollar CD market, accounting for about 60 percent of all CDs issued by banks located in London.
Japanese banks rank second in importance, their share of the market having increased from 9 percent in 1976 to 17 percent in 1979.
Euro CD maturities run from 30 days out to 5 years, but shorter terms ranging from one month to one year are most common.
By and large, the customer base is the same as that for domestic CDs, i.e., most Euro CDs are placed with the same large car4This conclusion is reached by Crane [3] . It should be pointed out, however, that investors may be willing to accept somewhat lower yields on the CDs of money center banks if these instruments have greater marketability than CDs issued by regional banks.
porations that are active purchasers of domestic CDs m the U. S. In fact, some of the largest CD dealers in the U. S. are represented in London, where they make an active market in Euro CDs. These dealers, and many large investors as well, view their investment activity as essentially one worldwide position and manage their Euro CD and domestic CD portfolios in an integrated fashion.
Inasmuch as there is a five-hour time zone difference between London and New York, perfect synchronization of delivery and payment on Euro CDs is very difficult.
Therefore, settlement for Euro CDs is normally two working days forward, which is the value date, and payment is made in clearing house funds. Dollar settlement is made in New York, even though the certificates themselves are issued and held in safekeeping in London.
The First National Bank of Chicago has set up a Euro CD clearing center in London to smooth payment and delivery on these instruments. It is estimated that about $20 billion of this amount was in the form of negotiable CDs. Some individual foreign branches have Yankee CDs outstanding well in excess of $1 billion. The U. S. branches of foreign banks at first placed most of their Yankee CDs directly with their established loan customers, who through experience were familiar with the reputations of the issuers. Since their names were not well known outside this small group, the U. S. branches of foreign banks were forced to rely on dealers to market their CDs as reliance on this source of funds grew.
The largest part of their offerings have until recently been placed through dealers, several of which are now active market makers for Yankee CDs. Foreign bank names have become much better known and acceptable in the U. S., however, so that today it is much more commonplace for foreign branches to sell their negotiable CDs directly at retail.
Secondary market trading in Yankee CDs has increased greatly in just the last several years so that the liquidity of such instruments now rivals that of better rated domestic CDs.
An important institutional feature of foreign banking operations in the U. S. is that, until recently, foreign branches have been state-licensed and not subject to Federal Reserve regulations.
Thus, until recently Yankee CDs have not been subject to reserve requirements under Regulation D. This exemption from regulation probably helped establish the market for Yankee CDs, because the U. S. branches of foreign banks could pay higher rates on their certificates than could domestic banks but still not incur higher costs than their U. S. banking competitors as a result of savings on reserve requirements.
The Among the largest investors in nonnegotiable CDs are public bodies, e.g., state and municipal governments.
Often, state law requires that public bodies invest their funds locally, that all investments be registered in the name of the governmental unit, and that investments be secured. A large share of banks' total large time deposits are secured CDs issued in registered form to state and local governments.
As might be expected, regional banks are more heavily dependent upon such funds than are the money center banks.
It is not just public bodies that invest in nonnegotiable certificates, however.
Some corporate investors are willing to sacrifice the liquidity provided by an instrument that can be traded in the secondary market for a small increase in yield.
Also, some banks have gentleman's agreements with customers who take their registered or book-entry CDs which provide that, in the event cash is needed on an emergency basis, the bank will exchange the registered CD for a bearer CD.
In addition to nonfinancial corporations, some money market funds have invested in nonnegotiable CDs.
Risk and Return Negotiable CDs subject investors to two major types of risk, credit risk' and marketability risk. Credit risk is the risk of default on the part of the bank issuing the CD. This is relevant even for U. S. banks which are insured by the FDIC, since domestic CDs are issued in large denominations and deposit insurance only covers up to $100,000 of a depositor's funds. Marketability risk reflects the fact that a ready buyer for a CD might not be available when the owner is ready to, sell. Although the secondary market in CDs is well developed, it does not possess the depth of the U. S. Government securities market. These risks are reflected in the yields on negotiable CDs. It should be noted, however, that yields on money market instruments may vary for reasons other than differences in risk, e.g., due to changes in their relative supplies.
Chart 3 plots the spread between the secondary market yields on two types of 3-month CDs, domestic and Euro, and the secondary market rate on 3-month Treasury bills. The spread is positive and tends to widen in periods of high interest rates. For example, the domestic CD-Treasury bill spread was generally below 100 basis points for the periods 1971-72 and 1976-78, but widened greatly in 1973-74. The spread peaked at 458 basis points in August 1974. The chart shows that rates on Euro CDs are almost always above those on domestic CDs, typically by about 20-30 basis points, and that the Euro-domestic CD rate spread tends to widen in periods, of high interest rates. The higher rate on Euro CDs in part reflects the credit risk premium required by investors in these instruments; this premium tends to increase in periods of stress in the financial markets.
There is no reserve requirement against such deposits, and therefore the total cost to the issuing institution is not necessarily greater than the total cost to a domestic bank issuing a CD. In fact, the reserve adjusted costs of domestic and Euro CDs tend to be very close in times of financial market normalcy [6] .
There is no published rate series for Yankee CDs. Dealers indicate, however, that Yankee CD rates move very closely, within plus or minus 10 basis points, of Euro CD rates.
These two types of CDs are good substitutes and their rates should be expected to move close together except due to technical factors, such as relative supply. On average, though, Yankee CD rates average somewhat lower than Euro CD rates.
There are two reasons for this. First, Yankee CDs, unlike Euro CDs are subject to U. S. laws and regulations and therefore do not bear sovereign or foreign country risk.
Second, it is easier and less costly for dealers to engage in Yankee CD transactions than in Euro CD transactions. Yankee CDs are purchased in the U. S. and positions are financed with RPs or Federal funds, while Euro CDs are purchased abroad and entail international money transfers.
Quality Ratings
One major rating firm, Moody's Investors Service, Inc., has begun to rate the CDs of banks. So far; only a small number of regional U. S. banks have received ratings and a handful of applications are in process.
Foreign banks issuing Yankee CDs, however, have more actively sought formal ratings than have U. S. banks. This is understand-able, since they are still attempting to establish their names with U. S. investors.
The rating process used by Moody's for CDs is virtually identical to that used for rating commercial paper. It is not the particular issue that is rated but rather the issuing organization itself.
The CD ratings, like those for commercial paper, are designated P-l, P-2, and P-3. Because of the closeness of the rating processes, one should never expect to see a divergence between a bank's CD rating and its commercial paper rating. It is possible, however, for a bank's CD rating to differ somewhat from the commercial paper rating of its parent holding company.
Standard & Poor's Corporation has begun rating the CDs of SLAs.
Like Moody's, S&P has experience rating commercial paper issued by SLAs, but has so far applied bond rating methods to thrift CDs because of their longer terms. If asked to rate shortterm thrift CDs, S&P will likely apply a variant of its commercial paper rating system.
Rates and Maturities
During the first decade of their existence, negotiable CDs were written exclusively under fixed interest coupon contracts.
Certificates were written specifying a particular rate of interest that would be paid for a given term to maturity.
This pricing arrangement suited investors quite well, at least during the relatively stable interest rate environment of the 1960's. Those seeking a compromise between return and liquidity could invest in short-dated negotiable CDs, while those seeking extra yield could extend the maturity of their investments out to six months or perhaps even longer. So long as the upward sloping yield curve remained the norm, banks and investors had a reasonable basis for trading off higher yield against longer term.
In the latter part of the 1960's interest rate conditions changed dramatically.
Interest rate fluctuations increased, and the general level of rates began to trend upward. Under such circumstances, investors can be expected to shift their preferences to shorter term instruments, and this happened in the CD market; by 1974 the average maturity of outstanding domestic CDs fell dramatically to about two months from the three-and-one-half-month length more common in the 1960's. In September 1974 the Federal Reserve provided banks an incentive to lengthen their negotiable CD maturities by restructuring reserve requirements in such a way as to raise the reserve cost of shorter term certificates.
This incentive was reinforced in December 1974 when reserve requirements were set at 6 percent for negotiable CDs with an original maturity of less than six months and at 3 percent for negotiable
CDs with an original ma-turity of six months or more: In 'October 1975 the reserve requirement was further lowered to 1 percent for CDS with original maturities of four years or more, and finally in January 1976 the requirement was lowered to 2½ percent on certificates with original maturities of from six months to four years. In keeping with this pattern, the marginal reserve program introduced in October 1979 exempts CDs' with original maturities of one year and greater.
In addition to these changes in reserve requirements, domestic banks had an incentive to increase CD maturities as a result of the deteriorating liquidity positions of their balance sheets.
By the mid-1970's, therefore, the time was ripe for a fundamental change in the terms under which negotiable CDs had traditionally been offered. to its customers on a selective basis fixed-rate rollover CDs, or "roly poly" CDs, in minimum amounts of $5 million.
These instruments had full terms to maturity of from two to five years, but consisted of a series of 6-month maturity instruments.
Investors would sign a contract to leave a deposit with the bank for, say, four years, but instead of receiving a CD maturing in four years would receive a 6-month CD. The contract obligated the investor to renew; or roll over, the 6-month instrument eight consecutive times at the rate negotiated at the inception of the contract.
Although the bank hoped to qualify for the four year CD reserve requirement with these deposits, a ruling by the Federal Reserve made the rollover CDs reservable at the higher 6-month maturity reserve requirement.
These instruments bore rates somewhat above the rate on Treasury notes of equal maturity, but below the rate offered on a straight two to five year CD. The feeling was that an investor would earn the long-term rate but get enhanced liquidity since a single 6-month issue in the series could be sold in the secondary market.
This fixed-rate type of instrument proved more attractive to the issuing banks than to the investing public during a period of rising interest rates.
Consequently, a sizable market in fixed-rate rollover CDs never developed.
Variable Rate CDs
Variable rate or variable coupon CDs (VRCDs or VCCDs) have the rollover feature described above but also entail periodic resettings of the coupon rate and periodic payment of interest.
Interest on each component or "leg" of a VRCD is calculated according to the same rules as on conventional
CDs. The dated date is the original dated date for the first leg, and for subsequent legs it is the date of the interest payment on the preceding leg. VRCDs were first offered in the Euro CD market, where floating rate instruments were an accepted method of doing business long before they were in' the U. S The VRCD was initially introduced in the domestic and Yankee CD markets by those large banks having Euro CD experience, but the new method of writing certificates was quickly adopted by the major regional banks as well. VRCDs were introduced domestically in 1975, grew in popularity in the latter 1970's, and have now become a major innovation in the market for negotiable CDs.
VRCDs range in full maturity from six months to four years, the most common full maturities being six months and one year.
The rollover period for these instruments varies. For example, from 1975 to 1977, three-and six-month rollovers were common. The higher short-term interest rates of 1979 and 1980, however, have resulted in the three-month and one-month rollovers becoming standard. Investor preferences for full maturity and rollover frequency are directly related to expected interest rate patterns, 'periods of stable or declining rates leading to preferences for longer full maturities and longer rolls, and periods of rising rates and upward sloping yield curves leading to preferences for shorter maturities and 'shorter rolls. The four VRCD issues having -the greatest popularity at present are ( 1) six-month '(full 'maturity) /three-month (roll), (2) six-month/ one-month, CD. This premium, which compensates investors for the credit risk entailed by tying funds up for longer periods, increases with the maturity of the VRCD.
The premium has usually been about 15 basis points for sixmonth full maturities, 20 basis points for one-year full maturities, and 25 basis points for eighteen-month full maturities.
As in the case of conventional CDs, VRCDs issued by the top tier banks carry somewhat lower rates. than those issued by the lesser name institutions.
The typical size of a VRCD issue ranges from $50-$200 million for large banks and $25-$100 million for smaller banks, but issues as large as $400 million are not uncommon.
The largest portion of VRCD issues is underwritten by dealers, who usually charge the issuing bank a small commission for underwriting and distribution services. Dealers have been willing to take larger positions in VRCDs than in longer term conventional CDs since there is less market risk involved and because retail demand has proved quite strong. So far, retail demand has been so strong that dealers have placed a major portion of newly issued VRCDs on an order basis.
Investors treat VRCDs as a conventional CD once the coupon has been set for the last time and the certificate is on its last leg. Since VRCDs carry an interest premium over the rate paid on a conventional CD, a VRCD, on its last leg offers the potential for trading profits.
Estimates by market participants place the total amount of VRCDs outstanding in early 1980 at $12 billion, about double the amount outstanding only six months earlier.
Most of these are domestic CDs. Thus, in the short time since they have become popular, VRCDs have grown to equal over 10 percent of the total volume of domestic CDs outstanding.
To date, money market funds have been the most active investors in VRCDs.
Dealers
There are currently about 25 dealers in CDs, all of which are active in the domestic CDs of top tier banks and some of which specialize in regional names or Yankee CDs.
The center of the dealer market is New York City, but the larger dealers have branches in major U. S. cities and in London.
Two main functions of the CD dealers are to distribute CDs at retail, either after first taking new issues into their own positions or by acting as brokers, and to support a secondary market in negotiable CDs. In accomplishing the latter, dealers must stand ready to make a market, i.e., buy and sell CDs. Bid and offering prices are constantly maintained and the typical spread is between 5 and 10 basis points, but narrower spreads on good names with short remaining terms to maturity are common. The normal round-lot trade in negotiable CDs between dealers and retail customers is $1 million, but increases to $5 million for interdealer trades.
There is, of course, a great deal of variety among the CDs being traded at any given time with respect to issuer, maturity, and other contractual terms. Consequently, dealers post bid and asked prices for certificates issued by a particular tier bank, with maturity identified as early or late in a particular month. For 'example, the bid and ask price for a top trading name might be for "early December" or "late January."
Financing of dealer CD positions is largely done using RPs.
Since CD collateral is more risky than U. S. Government security collateral, RPs against CDs are usually slightly more expensive than RPs against, say, Treasury bills. For the same reason, it is more difficult to get term RP financing for CDs. Normal practice in the RP market is to finance the face value of a money market instrument.
Since CDs bear interest, dealers must finance any accrued interest on CDs held in position from some source other than RP, e.g., from capital.. Growth in dealer activity has paralleled growth in the market for negotiable CDs. As the market expanded in the 1960's daily average dealer transactions were in the $50-$60 million range, and the daily average dealer positions ranged from $200-$300 million.
As mentioned, the secondary market nearly dried up in 1969, daily average dealer transactions falling to only $9 million and daily average positions falling to only $27 million during that year. Dealer activity burgeoned in the 1970's, when trading opportunities increased due to the more aggressive marketing of negotiable CDs by regional banks and with the development of the Yankee CD. By 1975, for example, daily average dealer positions increased about five-fold to $1.4 billion and transactions increased sixteen times to $800 million.
By 1979, positions further expanded to $2.7 billion and transactions to $1.7 billion.
Summary
The market for negotiable CDs issued domestically by U. S. banks grew rapidly but, due to the effects of interest rate regulation, unevenly during the 1960's. Regulation Q restrictions on rates that could be paid on domestic CDs led to the introduction of the Euro CD in 1966. After interest-rate ceilings on domestic CDs were removed in the early 1970's the market grew dramatically. Regional banks became particularly active issuers during this period, and the U. S. branches of foreign banks began issuing Yankee CDs. Most recently, savings and loan associations have also begun issuing CDs. Investors can now choose among a number of issuers in selecting CDs, i.e., domestic, Euro, Yankee, and thrift.
Not only have the types of issuers multiplied, but the character of CD contracts has changed as well. The conventional fixed-rate CD, which is primarily a short-term instrument, has been modified to extend the term and float the rate.
The resulting instruThe rate of change in the market for negotiable ment, the variable rate CD, has quickly gained popuCDs has been particularly rapid in recent years. This larity among investors.
The terms under which change is the outcome of competitive forces working VRCDs are offered, however, change constantly in to redesign a financial market to better suit the needs response to investor preferences.
of its major participants. 
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